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ESSAY
Walking in Their Shoes: Paying
Respect to Incompetent Patients
D. Don Welch*
One of the great games that judges play is to act as if their deci-
sions are based on objective standards. For understandable reasons,judges prefer that their decrees be seen as resting on accepted princi-
ples of law rather than on a judicial choice between two competing,
plausible opinions. One such accepted principle has been that decisions
giving consent for medical treatment of incompetent patients should be
made to serve the "best interests" of the patients.' In recent years,
courts increasingly have used a new, seemingly less objective standard
called "substituted judgment" to replace the best interests standard in
certain situations. Under this new standard, a court substitutes the
judgment of a third party for that of the incompetent patient. The
third party tries to make the decision the incompetent patient would
have made if competent.2 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has taken
* Associate Dean and Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., Baylor
University, 1969; M.A., Vanderbilt University, 1975; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University, 1976. I would
like to thank my colleagues Ellen Wright Clayton and Richard Zaner for their comments, and to
acknowledge the contributions of Heather Cairns, Jeff Harkleroad, and Chris Marshburn as re-
search assistants.
1. See In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 179, 372 A.2d 360, 366 (Ch. Div. 1977) (stating that
"[t]he right of the individual, then, is to have a determination that he or she can make the deter-
mination and, if not, to have some competent able person to make it in the best interests of the
person").
Another statement of the best interests standard is that it requires "what, from an objective
standpoint, appears to promote a patient's good without reference to the patient's actual or sup-
posed preferences." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & Bi-
OMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 179 (1982) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
2. See Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
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the lead in this emerging trend with the decisions in In re Conroy3 and
its progeny,4 developing an analytical scheme that incorporates both
the best interests standard and the substituted judgment standard de-
pending on the facts of particular cases.
The thesis of this Essay is that the limited recognition of the sub-
stituted judgment standard should be expanded to the point that best
interests considerations are understood to be only an ingredient in sub-
stituted judgment decision making. The argument involves two phases.
The first phase of the argument is to ask and answer three questions:
(1) Why do we value informed consent? (2) What is the meaning of the
"incompetence" exception to the requirement of informed consent? (3)
What do the answers to these first two questions tell us about the char-
acter of third-party consent, when a particular patient has been found
to be incompetent? This line of questioning leads to a conclusion that
considerations of substituted judgment should be given a clear priority
over considerations that traditionally have been labeled the patient's
best interests.
The second phase of the argument is to analyze the nature of the
best interests standard itself: to examine what best interests means,
how it is determined, and how the concept has been used by courts.
This analysis demonstrates that rather than being an independent
value, however subservient to substituted judgment in our delibera-
tions, best interests ultimately should be understood as only a subpart
of substituted judgment concerns. This characterization of best inter-
ests criteria lends support to the recommendations flowing from the
first phase of the argument.
This Essay specifically focuses on how third-party decisions regard-
ing consent to treatment should be made. Final decisions about treat-
ment will not always be dictated by expressions of consent. Historically
other factors have overridden patient preferences: the public welfare
when vaccinations have been ordered5 and the needs of innocent third
3. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
4. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
5. The case cited most often which declares that mandatory immunization against dangerous
diseases is a constitutionally valid exercise of police power is Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905). There, the compelling interest of the state in protecting the public's health outweighed
personally preferred medical treatment.
The state also has restricted freedom from compulsory vaccination to protect the individual
child, in a parens patriae mode, as well as to protect other children in the community. See Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
For a list of cases that hold much the same, see Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222 (Miss.
1980) (stating that "[a]ccording to the great weight of authority, it is within the police power of
the State to require that school children be vaccinated against smallpox"); cf. Maier v. Besser, 73
Misc. 2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 1972). This case, however, never reached the highest
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INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
parties when medical treatment has been ordered.6 Just as the auton-
omy of competent patients is not the only value to be honored in medi-
cal decisions, respect for the wishes of surrogate decision makers should
not always control these medical decisions. While third-party consent is
not determinative of choices of treatment in every case, it should play a
major role, and we should be very clear about what a person is being
asked to do in considering whether to grant such consent.
I. THE VALUE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Today the notion of "informed consent" is in vogue. It seems al-
most silly to spend time identifying the value of informed consent in
light of the prominence-the almost sacred status-accorded this con-
cept in recent years. The idea of informed consent, however, does not
have a long and honored position in the history of the practice of
medicine.7 Traditionally the physician has assumed an authoritative
role that includes discretion to make decisions on behalf of patients.
Hippocrates counseled physicians to hide most things from their pa-
tients while caring for them and to distract patients from thinking
about their illnesses.' While this view of the physician-patient relation-
ship may seem hopelessly antiquated today, the belief that the doctor
should control information about the patient's condition persisted well
into modern times. In 1847 the American Medical Association adopted
a code of ethics that encouraged doctors to bring hope and comfort to
their sick patients and to avoid anything that would discourage or de-
press them."
Consent became a prominent concern within the medical commu-
nity as a result of the Nuremberg trial revelations of medical atrocities
inflicted by physicians in Nazi Germany.10 However, change came to the
world of medicine not through internal reform but through challenges
from the outside. Over seventy years ago, Justice Benjamin Cardozo in
court in New York.
6. Some courts have authorized blood transfusions, over the refusal of a pregnant woman, to
save a fetus. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). The District of Columbia Circuit imposed on a mother
treatment required to keep her alive citing, among other reasons, the argument that "[t]he state,
as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it should not allow this most
ultimate of voluntary abandonments." Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
7. For a full history of the doctrine of informed consent, see R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP,
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
8. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 4 (1984) (citing 2 HIPPOCRATES, DE-
CORUM 297 (W. Jones trans. 1967)).
9. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1847), reprinted in part in J.
KATZ, supra note 8, at 230-31.
10. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7, at 151-87.
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Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital11 set the stage for the
development of a modern doctrine of consent when he said that all
adults should be able to decide what would be done to their bodies.12
Cardozo was expounding not a doctrine of knowledgeable self-determi-
nation but protection against unauthorized bodily invasion. Cardozo's
consent doctrine became the informed consent doctrine in the 1957 case
of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.13
Prior to 1957 legal charges could be brought for unlawful-i.e., un-
authorized-touching of one's body, but the concern was with the pres-
ence of consent, not the nature or extent of disclosure. 4 While much of
the decision in Salgo addressed traditional concepts of malpractice and
negligence, the court also explicitly laid down a standard for disclosure.
In Salgo a patient had entered the hospital for diagnostic tests related
to circulatory problems. When he became paralyzed from the waist
down following one of these tests, he charged, among other things, that
his physician had not informed him of the nature of the planned test.
Finding in the patient's favor, the court ruled that if physicians do not
disclose all of the information to their patients that would be needed in
order to make intelligent decisions about proposed medical treatments,
they breach their duties to patients and face liability. 5
The doctrine of informed consent injected a significant element of
patient participation into medical decision making, a realm long domi-
nated by paternalistic concerns and physician prerogative with regard
to patient care. Commentators have formulated various definitions of
informed consent. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress have identi-
fied the fundamental elements of informed consent as: (1) disclosure of
information, (2) comprehension of information, (3) voluntary consent,
and (4) competence to consent. 16 Thus, the requirement for informed
consent is met when competent patients have received and understood
information relevant to their condition and proposed procedures and
have freely authorized the implementation of those procedures.' 7
11. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
12. Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
13. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
14. See Tancredi & Weisstub, Malpractice in American Psychiatry: Toward a Restructuring
of the Psychiatrist-Patient Relationship, in 2 LAw AND MENTAL HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 83, 103 (D. Weisstub ed. 1986).
15. Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
16. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 70 (2d ed. 1983). Some
commentators have suggested that informed consent be replaced by a lower level of patient in-
volvement, such as patient assent. See generally P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED
CONSENT- LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987).
17. There is the question of whether fully informed consent is ever possible, much less prac-
tical. The problem has been articulated by William Curran:
I do not believe that a fully informed consent can be obtained from nonscientifically trained
[Vol. 42:16171620
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Why is such informed consent important? What basic values, what
root concerns, underlie our confidence that informed consent is an im-
portant matter? A number of scholars have identified benefits that flow
from adherence to the doctrine. Alexander Capron, for example, has de-
scribed six functions served by informed consent: (1) promotion of indi-
vidual autonomy, (2) protection of patients and subjects, (3) avoidance
of fraud and duress, (4) encouragement of self-scrutiny by medical pro-
fessionals, (5) promotion of rational decisions, and (6) involvement of
the public in promoting autonomy as a general social value and in con-
trolling biomedical research.'"
Scholars have identified other ends as being served by informed
consent. Patients are more likely to get appropriate treatment if they
are informed and involved.19 Patient support and cooperation can aid in
the success of treatment,2 ° and in obtaining patient compliance with
medical advice.2' Studies show that patients involved in treatment are
more comfortable, less worried, less withdrawn, and experience shorter
hospital stays.22 Granting self-determination to psychiatric patients
tempers the intrusion of psychiatry on important social values.2" Ob-
taining consent provides protection to medical researchers and care giv-
ers from accusations of improper treatment. On a grander scale,
requiring truly informed consent may avoid domination by experts and
thus foster democracy and freedom.24
Many commentators justify informed consent requirements with
these sorts of beneficial consequences in mind, and in doing so impli-
subjects, if by this we mean a complete understanding of the entire project, its objectives, its
risks, its benefits, etc. Even the research team may not understand all of these aspects, not
only because of self-interest but also because of their own limits of knowledge and experience.
Curran, Ethical Issues in Short Term and Long Term Psychiatric Research, in MEDICAL, MORAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 18, 24 (F. Ayd, Jr. ed. 1974) (emphasis in original).
Studies have shown that strict requirements of patient informed consent are often not met.
See, e.g., C. LIDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A
STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 136-39 (1984) [hereinafter LIDZ & MEISEL].
18. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 340-76 (1974); see also J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT?
82-89 (1975).
19. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 42-44.
20. Brodsky, Shaw & McMahon, Neuropsychiatric Intervention in the Rehabilitation of
Head Injured Patients, 10 PSYCHIATRIC J.U. OTTAWA 237 (1985).
21. Francis, Korsch & Morris, Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication: Patients' Response
to Medical Advice, 280 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535 (1969); Stone, Patient Compliance and the Role of
the Expert, 35 J. Soc. ISSUES 34 (1979).
22. Tobiasen & Hiebert, Burns and Adjustment to Injury: Do Psychological Coping Strate-
gies Help? 25 J. TRAUMA 1151 (1985).
23. LIDZ & MEISEL, supra note 17, at 7. Our society's individualistic strand places value on
personal autonomy and independence, resisting efforts to label particular persons as deviant and
favoring protection of the weak from those in more powerful positions.
24. See E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 335-36 (1970).
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cate the basic bioethical principle of beneficence.25 The principle of be-
neficence is based on the idea that medical treatment should provide
some benefit. When this value controls, decisions about treatment are
basically teleological in character-that is, we evaluate any potential
course of action in terms of the positive consequences that will result.26
Whereas beneficence leads us to think teleologically, in terms of
ends and consequences, the bioethical principle of autonomy leads us to
think deontologically, in terms of fidelity to first principles and estab-
lished values. In the informed consent context, autonomy leads us to
think specifically in terms of principles and values related to the dignity
of persons. Respecting a patient's autonomy does not necessarily entail
concern for consequences and thus can be at odds with a physician's
vision of medical benefit. When such a conflict arises, an approach to
informed consent that begins with patient autonomy places a priority
on adherence to that principle over considerations of beneficial results.
While informed consent can be grounded either teleologically or
deontologically, the principle retains its integrity only when the latter
course is taken. All of the benefits that have been identified as following
from an insistence on informed consent may be worthwhile. But this
kind of calculation does not provide the proper basis for valuing in-
formed consent. We value informed consent not in order to achieve cer-
tain other goals, but because of our respect for persons, their bodily
autonomy, and their self-determination. We do not view a person's
right to control both treatment and research protocols as an instrumen-
tal good that serves some of the other benefits listed previously. Rather,
25. See, e.g., Guttmacher, Whole in Body, Mind, and Spirit: Holistic Health and Limits of
Medicine, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 55-59 (2d ed. 1982).
26. Beneficence can be further divided into individual beneficence and general benefi-
cence-a distinction that is particularly important in research contexts. Individual beneficence fo-
cuses on the benefit received by the person who is the subject of a particular procedure. General
beneficence, on the other hand, is concerned with the benefit that could accrue to a broader spec-
trum of society, perhaps humankind as a whole. In each case, the moral calculus is one of pursuing
a course of action that will lead to medical benefit.
27. E.g., Lmz & MEISEL, supra note 17. These authors recognize that the doctrine can be
deontologically based (an inherent good flowing from the natural obligation of one human being to
another) or teleologically based (providing substantive benefit to those involved or other persons in
the society). Id. at 4. They state, however, that they see the consequentialist position as being
more relevant, id., and couch their discussion of the role of the patient in medical decision making
as a way of getting information needed to make the most beneficial decision:
The physician's role in medical decisionmaking is primarily cognitive, medical, and tech-
nical. The patient's role is primarily affective, personal, and subjective. Informed consent
views medical decisionmaking as a mix of technical and personal considerations; decisions
about medical care are not to be made exclusively by physicians, because only the patient has
access to the personal information, which is highly relevant to the making of the decision.
Id. at 11. One thesis of this Essay is that this reliance on a consequentialist basis for informed
consent is misplaced.
[Vol. 42:16171622
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respect for persons is an intrinsic good. Through informed consent we
recognize and give force to our respect for an individual's autonomy. In
other words, we require informed consent not because we hope to maxi-
mize benefit, but because we believe each person should be treated as
an autonomous human being.2"
By requiring informed consent in treatment and research settings,
our society has established the priority of individual autonomy over cal-
culations of benefit.2 9 In the landmark case of Natanson v. Klines0 the
court embraced this ordering of concerns. The court stated that Anglo-
American law is premised upon the principle of self-determination. All
individuals of sound mind are viewed as masters of their own bodies
with the freedom to refuse lifesaving or other medical treatments., The
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research concluded that patient self-
determination should receive priority over the value of life. 2 In addi-
tion, it found that patient self-determination was the "bedrock" of the
Commission's reflections on informed consent and the patient-practi-
tioner relationship. 33
28. A distinction should be made between insisting that informed consent be grounded in
deontological considerations and insisting that all specific decisions regarding informed consent in
concrete situations be made through deontological reasoning. The author has argued that neither
the teleological nor the deontological model provides an adequate framework for moral decision
making. See Welch, The Moral Dimension of Law, in LAW AND MORALITY 8-12 (D. Welch ed.
1987).
This type of distinction may help make sense of what could be seen to be incompatible state-
ments in R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7. On the one hand, they state that respect for
autonomy is a prima facie principle "equally weighted" with other moral principles (e.g., benefi-
cence, justice) "in abstraction from particular circumstances." Id. at 18. On the other hand, they
assert that autonomy is "the single most important moral value for informed consent." Id.
It is not inconsistent to hold that autonomy is the primary value which grounds and gives
meaning to informed consent and, at the same time, to argue that medical problems cannot be
resolved with a preemptive weight given to concerns for autonomy and informed consent. Indeed,
acceptance of the recognized exceptions to informed consent rests upon this distinction.
29. This clear separation of the autonomy based deontological grounding from the benefit
oriented teleological argument is, unfortunately, not always observed. For example, one study used
an ends oriented statement to make the deontological argument: "[T]he requirement of informed
consent is justifiable to the extent that it is reasonably calculated to promote the autonomy of
individuals. A further deontological justification for informed consent arises from the fact that it
also promotes another important and widely held value, rationality." LIDZ & MEISEL, supra note
17, at 328.
These observers recognize, however, that the beneficial consequences flowing from enforce-
ment of informed consent could probably not justify the required expenditure of time, resources,
and good will required to meet this standard and thus conclude: "Yet we believe, on deontological
grounds, that informed consent must not be abandoned." Id. at 330 (emphasis in original).
30. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
31. Id. at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
32. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 26-27, 44 (1983).
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 50-51.
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Numerous examples exist, however, of a willingness to "trade off"
the concern for autonomy for projected benefits. Fay Rozovsky, in a
study of statutory standards regarding consent, suggested that patients'
rights to autonomy and privacy should prevail unless state interests
compel a different decision or unless the best interests of patients
would be better served by overriding patient autonomy and privacy.3,
James F. Drane has described the doctrine of informed consent as bal-
ancing the values of beneficence and autonomy.35 In an appropriate or-
dering of norms, however, autonomy is not a benefit to be balanced
with other benefits in the context of informed consent.
Patient autonomy, as given meaning through informed consent,
takes precedence over benefits from medical treatments and, in certain
contexts, the courts have readily and clearly expressed this priority.
38
We have little difficulty in accepting the priority of patient choice for
competent patients. Ill or injured persons who seek medical assistance
are asking medical providers "to put themselves-their knowledge,
time, energies, and experience-responsively at their disposal. '3 7 The
key to effective care is responsiveness, not only to the results of diag-
nostic tests but to the patients seeking help. Incompetent patients are
no less deserving of responsive care from others than are competent pa-
tients. Our reasoning should be just as clear when considering the plight
of incompetent patients, else we compound their plight by refusing to
34. F. RozovsKy, CONSENT TO TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 371 (1984).
35. See Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 17.
Drane's argument illustrates the importance of clear thinking on the rationale underlying the doc-
trine of informed consent. His conceptualization of informed consent yields a conclusion that is
wholly contrary to the thesis of this Essay: "Incompetence both creates a new obligation to iden-
tify a surrogate and provides a basis for the physician to set aside the informed consent require-
ment in favor of what he or she thinks is best for the patient." Id.
The problem with this propensity on the part of some observers to override respect for auton-
omy through a calculation of what is in the patient's best interests will become more evident as we
look at the way we handle consent questions for patients who have been judged to be incompetent
to make their own decisions. As is argued below, a finding of incompetence should not entail an
automatic resort to a best interests calculation.
36. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Board of Retirement of Kern County Employees' Retirement
Ass'n, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973) (finding that the courts do not have the
power to protect the state's interests in preserving life by forcing a competent adult to accept
unwanted treatment); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (upholding a decision to re-
move life-sustaining mechanical respirator on right to privacy grounds); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jack-
son, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985) (upholding a refusal to appoint a guardian when a
competent patient refused transfusion on religious grounds), vacated, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562
(1986); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (finding that the right to
privacy includes the right to make a medically irrational choice); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033
(Miss. 1985) (holding that the state's interest in having the patient testify at the trial was not
sufficiently compelling to override religious rights to refuse transfusion); In re Quackenbush, 156
N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Prob. Div. 1978) (holding that the patient's right to privacy over-
rides the state's interests in preservation of life in case of extensive invasive medical treatment).
37. R. ZANER, ETHICS AND THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER 54 (1988).
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respect what we know about them as unique individuals. Such a refusal
would mean that their incompetence not only entails the loss of ability
to exercise autonomous judgment but also a loss of dignity, as they are
reduced to someone else's version of a reasonable person.
II. THE INCOMPETENCE EXCEPTION TO INFORMED CONSENT
If we view informed consent as a reflection of our respect for indi-
vidual autonomy and not as a means of achieving some other good end,
what does this view say about our second question? What is the mean-
ing of the incompetence exception to the requirement of informed
consent?38
A full discussion of the meaning of competence and appropriate
tests for its determination is not possible here. However, there are a few
general implications of the concern for autonomy in competence consid-
erations that should be mentioned. Competence is the measure of
whether persons possess the capability for autonomous action. Incom-
petence means that persons are not able to exercise self-determination
in a meaningful way. When persons are not able to understand their
own situations, when they are unable to comprehend the likely results
of alternative procedures, then those persons are not autonomous in the
context of the particular purpose and setting at hand. Self-determina-
tion is not possible, and informed consent in its ordinary meaning can-
not be a reality.
Persons are judged to be incompetent legally when they are found
to be incapable of making personal decisions regarding their care and
welfare. This judgment may be made because of age (in the case of chil-
dren) or condition (mental illness, retardation, senility, or a comatose
state). Incompetence is not always an either/or proposition. Often phy-
38. There are other recognized exceptions to the requirement of informed consent: medical
emergency, danger to others, patient waiver, and therapeutic privilege. While this Essay focuses on
the incompetent patient, this analysis is not irrelevant to formulating a conceptual basis for other
exceptions. It could be argued that the only exceptions to the requirement of informed consent
that should be allowed are those that can be supported by concerns for respect for persons, not by
considerations of medical benefit. Thus, for example, the medical emergency exception could be
justified as allowing temporary measures that maintain or restore to the individuals the opportu-
nity to exercise their own judgment. Exceptions to informed consent requirements when others are
endangered give evidence of respect for those other persons. The patient waiver is a clear example
of allowing persons self-determination about being informed-the right to be informed is not an
obligation to be informed.
The therapeutic privilege exception has been the most troubling of the exceptions to informed
consent. This exception allows a physician to withhold information when, in the judgment of the
doctor, that information would have a negative impact on the patient's health, not in cases in
which the physician believes that the information would lead the patient to refuse desirable treat-




sicians deal with gradations along a continuum, and certification of a
patient as incompetent requires drawing a line through an unbroken
string of progressions. Patients may be competent for one purpose but
not for another; a particular patient may be competent one day and
incompetent the next. Such cases present a danger of measuring compe-
tence by the degree to which a patient agrees with a physician's deci-
sions. The following story reflects this problem:
In Melbourne, Australia, John McEwan, a 27-year-old quadriplegic on a respi-
rator, was certified insane by hospital officials when he expressed a wish to die and
went on a hunger strike. McEwan's treatment continued on the basis of the certifi-
cation. When he changed his mind, he was certified as sane. The hospital also de-
nied the validity of a . . . [Do Not Resuscitate] order McEwan signed, saying he
was too depressed to be responsible for this document. McEwan was eventually
released from the hospital, and died ten weeks later.3 9
A Massachusetts appellate court commented upon a similar confu-
sion of competence and agreement in reviewing a probate court's judg-
ment of the competence of a woman refusing amputation of her
gangrenous leg.40 The probate court judge had ruled that the patient
was legally incompetent because she had not made a rational choice af-
ter careful consideration of the medical alternatives. The appellate
court, however, noted that (1) her competence was not questioned until
she withdrew her consent to the treatment preferred by the attending
physicians, 41 and (2) the fact that her decision is unfortunate, or seen to
be medically irrational, does not justify a conclusion that her capacity
to make the decision is impaired to the point of legal incompetence. 2
A very real difficulty often exists, however, in deciding whether
competence can be determined apart from judging particular decisions.
On the one hand, we want to avoid the danger of judging as incompe-
tent those with whom we disagree. This goal can be accomplished by
separating respect for persons from respect for their decisions. 3 In this
vein, our respect for a person's autonomy is not predicated on a case by
case examination of each decision. We do not determine whether each
decision appears to meet our expectations of what a deliberate, in-
formed, consistent choice would be.
On the other hand, an analysis of a patient's decision has a role in
39. The Latest Word, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1986, at 52 (citation omitted).
40. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
41. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
42. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
43. An example of the kind of approach that should be avoided is found in the language of a
Colorado Supreme Court decision in which the court implied that statutory and common-law pro-
tection of the right to withhold consent exists unless it is clear that the patient "lacked the capac-
ity to participate in such decisions or that his refusal to submit to treatment with prolixin was
itself irrational or unreasonable." Goedecke v. Department of Insts., 198 Colo. 407, 411, 603 P.2d
123, 125 (1979) (emphasis added).
1626 [Vol. 42:1617
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determining competence. It is difficult to know how to judge a person's
competence apart from looking at that person's decisions. We have a
clearer notion of what an autonomous decision is than we do of what an
autonomous person is. Further, a focus on particular decisions is cer-
tainly more in keeping with the nature of our desire to require informed
consent, which in turn is concerned with specific people making specific
decisions. An autonomous person can fail to act autonomously in cer-
tain situations, such as when that person is overwhelmed by informa-
tion, lacks necessary facts, or is manipulated by clever presentations of
information. 4
One test physicians use to assess competence is to ask whether a
patient makes a choice similar to that which a reasonable person would
make; another is to ask whether the choice is based on rational reasons.
Each of these tests is biased toward the patient who chooses to accept
the treatment advice of physicians. 45 Such a bias is particularly pro-
nounced in psychiatric settings in which resistance to following drug
therapy instructions is often viewed as "a form of symptomatic behav-
ior, involving hostility, acting out, and paranoid delusions. '46
"Whatever mental illness is, the belief that patients are mentally ill af-
fects both the staff's and the patients' perceptions of [the] patients'
abilities to participate in decisionmaking, regardless of the legal pre-
sumption of competency. ' 47 Such a slant in perceptions of competence
is not relegated to psychiatric settings: "A particular medical setting
establishes certain expectations about what a reasonable person would
do, and these expectations play an important role in competency deter-
minations. '45 Deviation from established expectations can lead to a
judgment that a patient's decision making ability, and competence, is
impaired because the patient harbors prejudices about health care.
The finding of incompetence should precede any calculation of
medical benefits. It is a very troubling fact, if it is true, that decisions as
to patient competence often involve a tradeoff between respect for au-
tonomy and beneficence.4 9 When we think about treatment of incompe-
tent patients without their consent, we should not think in terms of
medical necessity overriding the value of informed consent. Instead, we
should only think in terms of acting in circumstances in which informed
44. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7, at 237.
45. Brown, Psychiatric Treatment Refusal, Patient Competence, and Informed Consent, 8
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 90 (1986).
46. Id. at 85.
47. LIDZ & MEISEL, supra note 17, at 326.
48. Drane, supra note 35, at 18.
49. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7, at 291. Faden and Beauchamp assert that such
tradeoffs are usually made in determinations of the competence of patients and subjects. Id.
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consent is not possible.
When we allow an incompetence exception to informed consent, we
are not balancing the value of autonomy with the value of beneficence.
Rather, we are admitting that our normal way of showing respect for
that person is not appropriate and that another vehicle must be found.
That vehicle is third-party consent.
In this regard, I take exception to the way in which Tom
Beauchamp and Ruth Faden legitimize third-party consent:
[I]f a person is nonautonomous and situated in a context in which consent is re-
quired, it is a prima facie moral principle (not derived from the principle of respect
for autonomy, but rather from beneficence) that some mechanism for the authori-
zation of procedures or decisions other than obtaining the person's consent should
be instituted."'
This difference over the philosophical grounding for third-party consent
has important implications for the choice of standards to be used in
making these decisions about treatment, as will be seen below. 1
III. GROUNDS FOR TREATMENT OF INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
While much of the discussion about medical care for the incompe-
tent has focused on the right to refuse treatment, that discussion begins
with the premise that incompetence does not compromise a patient's
right to treatment. The impossibility of securing a patient's consent in
the moment of decision should not become a barrier to the patient's
receiving appropriate medical care.2
Because of the variety of circumstances in which this issue has
arisen, a patchwork of judicial precedents on the right of an incompe-
tent to refuse treatment has resulted. The right has been noted in com-
mon law53 and in constitutional law.5 4 While courts most easily deal
with cases in which a person expressed a desire, when competent, to
invoke the right to refuse treatment, the recognition of that right has
not been limited to that fact situation. Courts have also recognized the
"right to refuse treatment and allow life to terminate through natural
forces" for incompetent patients who have not expressed clearly their
wish for that choice.5 5 The issue, then, is not whether incompetent pa-
50. Id. at 288 (emphasis in original).
51. See infra Part III.
52. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
53. E.g., Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (right to privacy), modi-
fied sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981).
54. E.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Super. Ct.
1984); Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
55. In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 937, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (Sup. Ct.
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tients have a right to receive or reject medical treatment, but how and
by whom decisions about such treatment should be made.
A. The Appropriateness of Substituted Judgment
If it is determined that a patient is not competent to consent to
certain procedures, and if we then turn to a third party to give consent,
what are we asking that third party to do? What is the nature of the
decision to be made? While there are many variations on this theme,
third parties have been asked to render their judgment in accord with
the two different guidelines: the incompetent person's best interests
and substituted judgment.
The best interests standard fits well with the concern for benefi-
cence. Under this approach, decisions are made for the incompetent
person which promote that person's best interests. Courts and others
who adhere to this guideline often use a fairly narrow, explicitly medi-
cal view of what the person's best interests are. Providers choose or
avoid procedures with an eye toward the consequences that will result
and the benefit of those consequences.
Substituted judgment is an effort to make the decision the person
would have made if competent. As we have seen time and time again,
subjects and patients do not always make the decisions that others feel
are in their best interests. The substituted judgment standard requires
the third party giving consent to sort through the incompetent person's
particular preferences. The factors to be weighed always will include
medical benefit, but they also may include such matters as a person's
aversion to or preference for risk, the way particular alternatives affect
the person's lifestyle, the person's religious beliefs, the impact on fam-
ily, and other considerations that are highly particular to an individual.
The substituted judgment standard should be chosen over the best
interests standard when a third party attempts to make a treatment
decision for another. The primary value to be protected is individual
autonomy, not well being. Informed consent is a measure of our respect
for that person's values, beliefs, and preferences, and third-party con-
sent should be viewed as an extension of that respect.
While a great deal has been written on the best interests and sub-
stituted judgment standards in recent years, considerable imprecision
and confusion still exist. As evidence I offer the fact that such leading
authorities as Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, and Alan Meisel could
write the following:
All surrogate decision makers are, in a general way, under a duty to act in the best




not in the statement of it but in giving content to it. The substituted judgment
approach is, in fact, one way of doing so. That is, a surrogate who makes a decision
for an incompetent patient on the basis of that patient's instructions-written or
oral, express or implied-is seeking to implement the patient's best interests as
that patient would have defined them. Thus, the substituted judgment approach is
merely one way in which the best interests standard is given content.56
This statement is exactly wrong. Substituted judgment is not a way
of giving content to the best interests standard. Rather, best interests is
one item that should be taken into account when making a substituted
judgment. The inverted relationship in which these authors place the
two concepts reflects their failure to acknowledge the priority that au-
tonomy should have over beneficence in their development of a theory
of informed consent. Autonomy may not always trump beneficence in
final decisions about treatment, but we should never lose sight of the
fact that informed consent-and by extension, third-party consent-is
a process in the service of respect for persons.
One approach to third-party consent incorporates both best inter-
ests and substituted judgment. For example:
The court should take the next occasion to carefully define a substituted judgment
and best interest rule that supports good faith decisions by families and physicians
to implement the wishes of incompetent patients if known, or to make treatment
decisions consistent with the patient's best interests if the patient's wishes are not
known.
57
However, the real world seldom presents us with such alternative
choices. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, faced with the application
of a guardian to remove a nasogastric feeding tube from an incompetent
nursing home patient, moved from the two categories of best interests
and substituted judgment to three tests: subjective,5" limited objec-
tive,59 and pure objective.6 0 This modification represents a recognition
of the difficulties posed by a bifurcation of patients' conditions, but
simply increasing the number of categories from two to three does not
56. P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A. MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT-. LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 99 (1987) (emphasis in original).
57. Annas, Precatory Prediction and Mindless Mimicry: The Case of Mary O'Connor, 18
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988, at 31, 33.
58. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-64, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-31 (1985) (stating that a subjective
test allows surrogate decision makers to make the decision they believe the patient would have
made when there have been clear expressions by the patient, when competent, of desires about
life-sustaining treatment).
59. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232 (finding that life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or
withdrawn when there is trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused treatment and
the burdens of continued life outweigh the benefits of that life for the patient).
60. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232 (holding that life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or
withdrawn if the net burdens of the patient's life with treatment clearly and markedly outweigh
the benefits of life and when administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane because
of recurring, unavoidable, and severe pain).
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offer a workable solution to the problem.
The dual-option approach dictates that one criterion be used for
one type of patient and a different criterion for a second type of pa-
tient. Patients who clearly fall into the substituted judgment category
are ones who gave clear, comprehensive (preferably written) statements
of their treatment preferences for a specific set of diagnostic, prognos-
tic, and life style circumstances prior to encountering such circum-
stances. In addition, they reaffirmed those preferences when the
particular situation developed. Further, patients falling into the substi-
tuted judgment category made both statements of preference while
fully informed, with no hint of duress, at a time when they were indis-
putably competent. On the other hand, patients who clearly fall into
the best interests category are unable to give any indication of their
wishes at the time and have given no prior indication of beliefs, values,
or preferences through direct statements or life style choices.
Obviously, most patients present themselves somewhere between
these two extremes. As a result, placing a patient into one category or
the other, or even within one of the three Conroy categories, is often an
arbitrary decision, difficult to justify when the consequence is so funda-
mental to the right to affect one's own medical treatment.
Most often those we label as incompetent come to us with histories
within which we can recognize meaningful value clusters. Exceptional
cases exist involving infants or persons who have had such severe
mental deficiencies throughout their lives that nothing can be identified
that approaches the valuing of a centered self."' In those rare cases in
which we have no clues to patient preference, substituted judgment
may look like an objective process. With no evidence to the contrary we
assume this patient would want what a normal, rational person would
want. As we shall see below, however, such a process has only the ap-
pearance of objectivity. 2 Aside from such special cases, decisions
should take into account any evidence available concerning the beliefs,
values, and priorities of the unique individual.
Those who work with handicapped persons sometimes refer to
those of us without serious handicaps as the "temporarily able bodied."
In the same sense, people we consider competent are temporarily com-
petent. We have all been children and thus legally incompetent. Many
of us will be considered incompetent for certain purposes near the end
of life. Between these phases is a host of physical, mental, and social
factors that may render each of us incompetent at one time or another.
61. Children constitute another unique class of individuals in that they have never been le-
gally competent to make decisions about medical treatment.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 75-96.
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In that vast majority of cases which involve persons with some history
of competence, when consent is required of a third party, the third
party should try to extend that person's right to self-determination
through the time of incompetence.
If we view third-party decisions in the context of acting out of re-
spect for the incompetent patient, the narrowness of any objective best
interests test becomes clear. Justice Stanton, in In re Visbeck, 3 offered
a criticism of the Conroy "objective" tests64 that illustrates the prob-
lem. Justice Stanton states, very straightforwardly, "I must say that I
think that rule [objective test] is wrong because it manifests a much too
limited view of what is at stake in these cases. 6 5 Stanton urges that
such quality of life considerations as losing mental capacity, being to-
tally dependent on others, and being deprived of all privacy be consid-
ered.66 Using these quality of life standards clearly involves a
substituted judgment: Responsible people who believe these factors
should be considered "are looking at the matter from the viewpoint of
the patient herself. They are thinking about whether the patient's life
has meaning for the patient herself, whether it has become impossibly
burdensome to the patient herself. '67
The Conroy court required the pain standard because it was look-
ing for some way to make these decisions that could be based on objec-
tive data. In its desire to limit the grounds for decision making to
something that can be measured, such as physical pain, the Conroy
court reduced a human being to a biological response system. An appro-
priate response to the predicament of sick and damaged human beings
does not simply measure the severity of pain, but understands suffering
in a more comprehensive way and looks to the desires of the patient to
find the best way to cope with such suffering. For the incompetent pa-
tient, indications of those desires can include prior expressions of pref-
erence, even advance written directives. The patterns of patients' lives
provide additional information about their values, goals, beliefs, and
lifestyle preferences. These decisions should not be thought of as falling
in line with some objective, reasonable standard. Instead, we should
recognize that subjective factors will influence each decision made by a
third party for an incompetent patient.6
63. 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (1986).
64. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
65. Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. at 539, 510 A.2d at 131.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 540, 510 A.2d at 132.
68. As Richard Zaner has observed: "Every case uniquely evokes prominent modalities of
feeling. Emotion, passion, striving, wanting ... all are in many modalities invariably found as
texturing every case of distress or damage." Zaner, Is "Ethicist" Anything to Call a Philosopher?,
7 Hum. STUD. 71, 83 (1984) (emphasis in original). All too often feelings in a medical context "are
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Attempts to ground third-party consent decisions in a substituted
judgment model are not without their critics. The New Jersey court in
Conroy, for example, concluded that "in the absence of adequate proof
of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-deter-
mination serves as the basis for substituted decision-making."6 9 Robert
Destro picks up on this theme, expressing his concern that once privacy
and self-determination rationales are used to permit third parties to ex-
ercise the rights of the mentally disabled, the decisions are reduced to a
functional analysis, creating "an open invitation to the making of legal
policy which is based on precisely the 'irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded"' which the Supreme Court condemned in the
Cleburne Living Center case.7 0
Other commentators have noted problems with substituted judg-
ment decisions because the decisions require the decision makers to
construct a patient's self without any meaningful background informa-
tion. These commentators argue that such a construct conceals the
"vacuum of subjective intentionality. 1 Ultimately, they assert, substi-
tuted judgment simply objectifies the standard of the patient which is
reconstructed by the values of the decision makers. 72
The response to such charges is fairly straightforward. Substituted
judgment does not involve making decisions without background infor-
mation. To the extent the standard is used to hide a vacuum of inten-
tionality, it is used wrongly. The purpose of the construct is to avoid an
objectified standard, to reject the too easy reliance on the values of sur-
rogate decision makers.
The strength of the substituted judgment standard lies precisely in
the help it gives us in avoiding the dangers identified by the Conroy
court and others. The point is, of course, that some third party must
make these decisions, lest the incompetent be denied any right to treat-
ment, and the questions are which party and on what grounds.
One clue about making substituted judgments lies in what Richard
Zaner calls affiliative feeling. He explains that effective clinical thinking
requires that the clinician appreciate the patient's experiences and feel-
apparently deliberately ignored as extraneous to the problems of medical management." Id. at 86.
69. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d. at 1231.
70. Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of Natu-
ral Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 71, 115 (1986) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985)).
71. Tancredi & Weisstub, supra note 14, at 107.
72. Id. In the same vein, Walter Weber has urged that the substituted judgment standard be
rejected as a "dangerous sham." Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1
ISSUES L. & MED. 131, 153 (1985).
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ings, and understand their significance to the patient. 3 Zaner's point is
that the patient's subjective life is not inaccessible to others. While he
is not directing his comments to incompetent patients, and is urging
clinicians actively to elicit patient responses repeatedly until the clini-
cian actually almost feels the patient's pain or symptoms, 7 4 the same
concern should apply to incompetent patients. The mode of discovery
may be more varied and imaginative with those who are unable clearly
to voice their needs and wishes, but the goal is the same: do not take
patients for granted. Do not assume any patient fits into a standard
mold. Strive to understand each patient's individuality, to empathize
with the patient's suffering and distress, and then to act on that
understanding.
B. The Fallacy of Best Interests
The best interests criterion requires that the surrogate decision
maker use an objective assessment of what will benefit the incompetent
patient. 5 Such an objective best interests standard does not exist. It is
an illusion, fostered by courts and medical providers. It is not surpris-
ing that courts and physicians would seek to rely on such a standard, in
the same way that it is not surprising that judges are drawn to other
formalistic modes of reasoning. A judicial decision that rests on an im-
partial application of an objective value premise appears to carry more
authority than a decision in which the judge openly admits to choosing
one opinion over another. In any dispute in which a judge chooses a
"best interests" option over others, however, the judge is accepting one
opinion about the most appropriate care for a patient over a differing
opinion.
The best interests standard may be appropriate in the context of
property dispositions because the decision concerns items which are
measured by monetary value. 6 Indeed, the best interests standard
originated in the context of resolving family disputes, controlling in-
competent persons' property, and authorizing gifts from the estates of
incompetent persons. 7 In the context of medical treatment decisions,
however, the best interests of the patient is "an evasive and almost en-
73. R. ZANER, supra note 37, at 318.
74. Id. at 316.
75. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 179-81.
76. Marzen, Medical Decision Making for the Incompetent Person: A Comprehensive Ap-
proach, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 293, 308 (1986).
77. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, sup'ra note 1, at 177. The substituted judgment standard originated





An analysis of the language judges have used in such cases is in-
structive. Consider the reasoning of the Beth Israel"9 court in discussing
how to decide whether treatment should be withheld from an incompe-
tent patient: "Clearly, some objective standards must be employed.
Otherwise, these matters will turn merely on the subjective attitudes or
personal beliefs of those making the decision. The danger in that is ob-
vious."80 The court refers to Conroy and Rivers v. Katz for specific
guidance about how such decisions should be made. The court also
looks to the New York Mental Hygiene Law section 8081 for a definition
of "best interests":
"[P]romoting personal well-being by the assessment of the risks, benefits and alter-
natives to the patient of a proposed major medical treatment taking into account
factors including the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of function-
ing, improvement in the quality of the patient's life with and without the proposed
major medical treatment and consistency with personal beliefs and values known to
be held by the patient."8
However, the court then says no procedure should be withheld if
doing so would conflict with the patient's prior wishes, or would be in-
consistent with the patient's "character or beliefs." s3 Further, the Beth
Israel court stated, "Lastly, the focus must always be on attempting to
ascertain what is or would be the particular patient's choice in the
matter .... 8"
The list of items suggested for consideration in contemplating what
the particular patient's choice would be includes such matters as the
patient's views on life-prolonging measures, the quality of the patient's
life, the patient's religious or ethical views, and the views of those close
to the patient.8 5 The Beth Israel court states that an objective best in-
terests standard must be used, but the content given to that stan-
dard-the patient's values, beliefs, character, and views on life-
prolonging measures, in short, a focus on what would be the particular
patient's choice-speaks to an effort to make the decision the patient
would have made, if competent. This approach, as the reader readily
will recognize, is a substituted judgment analysis, not a best interests
78. Marzen, supra note 76, at 309.
79. In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
80. Id. at 938, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
81. Id. at 938, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (citing Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80
(McKinney 1988)).
82. Id. at 938-39, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(d) (McKinney
1988)).
83. Id. at 939, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 517.





The certitude that accompanies judicial handling of a best interests
approach is probably rooted in the manner in which health care profes-
sionals and commentators have approached the subject. Thomas J.
O'Donnell has written about the ethical concepts of consent, for exam-
ple, but sees this approach as a problem only for researchers: "It is be-
cause procedures in the therapeutic context look solely to the good of
the individual patient that legitimate limitations of informed consent
(in the sense of the fully informed consent of the actual patient) pre-
sent no great problem."' The implication of this approach is clear: as
long as doctors are doing what they think is best for patients, they do
not have to pay attention to the patients' desires.
The way best interests is used often implies that some objective,
factual determination by a third party of a person's best interests is
possible. Such a determination often entails a narrow medical view of a
person's interests.
[P]hysicians are taught to search for the best treatment for a given problem and to
recommend that treatment to patients exhibiting that problem-indeed, to attempt
to convince the patients to accept the treatment if the patients exhibit any resis-
tance to the recommendation. And, for a physician, the "best" treatment is almost
always defined in technical medical terms-that treatment most likely to alleviate a
patient's illness-rather than in terms of a patient's personal preferences .... 7
The language of "medical necessity" is sometimes used to mask the
value judgments being made. The hospital administration in In re Es-
tate of Doroness petitioned for authority to administer blood during an
operation, "if in the opinion of the surgeon it were to become medically
necessary to do so. '" The court appointed the hospital administration
as temporary guardian to consent "if necessary," 90 ruling that "nothing
less than a fully conscious contemporaneous decision by the patient
will be sufficient to override evidence of medical necessity.""1 The ques-
tion is, of course, necessary for what? The answer is necessary to save a
life. The value choice being made is that living should take priority over
adherence to religious beliefs-a priority routinely rejected by many Je-
hovah's Witnesses. This particular case is complicated by the emer-
gency nature of the situation, at least when the first authorization was
sought. A second "emergency" authorization was sought two days later
when a blood clot developed, illustrating the often voiced concern that
86. O'Donnell, Ethical Concepts of Consent, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 17, at 1.
87. LIDz & MEISEL, supra note 17, at 322.
88. 517 Pa. 3, 534 A.2d 452 (1987).
89. Id. at 7, 534 A.2d at 454 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9, 534 A.2d at 455 (emphasis in original).
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physicians wait until emergencies develop in order to legitimize their
taking actions that are contrary to their patients' wishes.2"
Decisions about medical treatment are inherently subjective and
cannot be separated from the values and preferences of the decision
maker. If the values and preferences being used are not those of the
patient, the decisions will be colored by the personal eccentricities of
the decision maker. Howard Brody has observed that neonatologists, in
making arguments about what treatments were appropriate for
newborns, based their arguments on personal opinions. Consequently,
Brody found the phrase "the infant's best interests" useless in this con-
text. 3 Best interests simply cannot function as an objective criterion to
yield certain answers to these complex problems.
All treatment decisions, whether made by a patient or a physician,
are "tainted by idiosyncrasy. '94 Weighing the risks and benefits inher-
ent in a decision to undergo or to refuse treatment is a value laden
process. In the case of physicians, such factors as the physicians' educa-
tional background and the psychological and emotional effects of their
personal experiences may influence the balance.95 Ignoring the subjec-
tive elements that shape every physician's judgment is to imbue medi-
cal practice with a scientific aura that is foreign to the physicians who
insist the medicine they practice is an art.
The objective view of medical decisions is undermined by studies
that show wide variations in practice among similar cultures, or even
within the same country. 6 Medical practices are strongly influenced by
cultural values, by norms of local practice, and apparently by such fac-
tors as patients' marital status and possession of private medical insur-
ance. What is medically indicated or medically required is not an issue
of factual determination by uninvolved medical personnel. Best inter-
ests is a matter of one person's opinion about what is best. And if treat-
ment decisions are going to be based on someone's value influenced
opinion, should it not be the patient's opinion? That is what substi-
tuted judgment is all about.
When a substitute decision maker must be used, as in the case of
incompetent patients, every effort must be made to apply the patient's
values and concerns. A broader, holistic view of an individual's inter-
ests-physical, psychological, social, financial, and spiritual-subsumes
92, See id. at 7-8, 534 A.2d at 454-55.
93. See Brody, In the Best Interests of..., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988, at 37, 38.
94, Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The Rights of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Medication, 13
Am. J. & MED. 7, 19 (1987).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., L. PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE: VARIETIES OF TREATMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, ENGLAND, VEST GERMANY, AND FRANCE (1988).
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a scientific, medically indicated view of best interests into a substituted
judgment perspective. Only an effort to stand in that patient's shoes
will begin to reveal the totality of the patient's interests.
IV. INFORMED CONSENT AS INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT
The model of informed consent that emerges from this discussion
is very "this patient" oriented. While the emphasis of this Essay has
been on the implications of such an approach for standards of third-
party consent for incompetent patients, this approach also implies cer-
tain criteria for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure97 and the validity
and voluntariness of a patient's consent. This model of informed con-
sent cannot be imposed into the physician-patient relationship by
courts or critics. Its promise can be realized only as those involved on
both sides of conversations about treatment incorporate this view of the
roles of physicians and patients into the clinical setting. Taking this
approach seriously may well call for a recasting of the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient.""
Underlying this approach is an image of a covenant between doctor
and patient. This covenant model contrasts with the traditional medical
model. The medical model can increase the distance between doctor
and patient, emphasizing the superior position of the healer, while the
covenant model can close that gap, building a sense of community be-
tween the two. The first concern of the medical model is that persons
be healed, while the covenant model is first concerned that persons be
treated with respect. The medical model views informed consent as a
97. Judicial opinions about the standard by which to judge the adequacy of disclosure have
moved from the "reasonable medical practitioner" model, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960), to the "reasonable" person as patient standard, e.g., Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16 (1972). Some courts have focused more
recently on the particular patient receiving the information. See McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266,
287 S.E.2d 892 (1982); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
98. As one commentator has stated:
A superficial regard for consent would tend to argue that patient self-determination is impor-
tant, and that the consent mechanism is simply another instrument by which a patient's
rights or individual liberties are enhanced. But to interpret consent in this way is to succumb
to a legalistic view of the transaction and reduce the process to a piece of paper which the
patient signs. Valid consent, on the other hand, is more appropriately conceived as the inten-
tion of doctor and patient to be to each other persons, to establish a consensual therapeutic
relationship, to form a healing alliance. The consent document, together with all that it re-
flects, is symbolic of this intention.
H. SMITH & L. CHURCHILL, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PRIMARY CARE MEDICINE 63 (1986) (emphasis
in original). Smith and Churchill point out that such a therapeutic alliance entails mutual respect:
"[D]octors are not free to define the good for patients without their participation, but neither are
patients free to impose upon physicians notions of the good which are foreign to the physician's
personal values and professional standards." Id. at 58.
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step that must be taken in order to produce the most beneficial result.
The covenant model views informed consent as a step that must be
taken because we respect the autonomy of each person.
The medical model understands that patient autonomy is a value
to be protected but is more willing to balance that value with the medi-
cal good that can be achieved. A medical model posits third parties
making decisions for incompetent patients in the patients' best inter-
ests. Doctors are expected to provide adequate information for these
decisions, based on some notion of customary professional standards or
a notion of the rational patient.
The covenant model views patient autonomy as claiming priority,
over calculations of medical benefit. Consent is informed only when the
adequate information is provided so that the particular decision maker
can make an appropriate decision. Third-party decision makers should
focus on the personality of the particular incompetent patient rather
than on statements of what is medically indicated.
Even if incompetent, a person still has beliefs, values, and prefer-
ences. The patient is a person with rituals of meaning, symbols of inter-
pretation, and some developed sense of self. Even for persons
incompetent to exercise autonomous judgment, these personal attrib-
utes remain important. The whole purpose behind obtaining consent
from someone else on behalf of an incompetent person, the very reason
we do not simply give the researcher or the physician unfettered discre-
tion to do what is best, is to attempt to make the elements that com-
prise a unique personality-the patient's desires, needs, priorities, and
beliefs-as close to controlling in the decision as they would be if that
person were competent.
To return to our three questions: First, we value informed consent
because of our respect for persons and personal autonomy, our belief
that each person should be allowed to determine what happens to his or
her body. Second, in this context, the incompetence exception to a re-
quirement of informed consent means that a particular individual is not
capable of exercising that kind of autonomous judgment in a specific
setting. Third, when consent is sought from a third party, that person is
responsible to act consistently with the beliefs and values of the incom-
petent person. Substituted judgment is the guideline that best recog-
nizes this fundamental grounding of informed consent and that affords
the best opportunity for preserving the integrity of individuals when
they are not competent to make certain decisions for themselves.
I conclude this Essay with one final comment. Just as Justice Car-
dozo's opinion in SchloendorfJ gave voice to an uneasiness about a
model of the physician-patient relationship that did not protect pa-
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tients from unauthorized bodily invasion,99 the Nuremberg Trials
brought us face to face with the fundamental flaws of a system in which
the medical attendant dictates what will be done to the patient.100
Power has been reallocated. It is no longer acceptable to conceive of a
patient as being in the hands of a physician who is responsible for act-
ing in a way that will produce the greatest benefit. The model of a cove-
nant, with physician and patient exercising their independent judgment
and mutually agreeing upon a course of action, is more in keeping with
our conviction that patients, too, are to be respected as persons. Indeed,
the physician is authorized to act by the patient. A medical school may
give persons certain knowledge and skills and degrees, but those per-
sons are not physicians until someone called a patient grants them that
role.
99. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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